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Case Comment
KELL v. APPALACHIAN POWER CO.: AERIAL
APPLICATION OF HERBICIDES ON UTILITY
RIGHT-OF-WAYS
I. INTRODUCTION
Aerial application of herbicides and pesticides has increased greatly in re-
cent years.' With this increase and the related growth in the "crop dusting"
industry has come a new area for litigation and significantly broadened notions
of common law liability. Although case law on the subject is abundant, most
precedent deals primarily with "drift ' 2 and the vast majority of actions have
been grounded in negligence, nuisance, trespass or strict liability.3 As such, a
unique problem arises when the grantee of an easement uses aircraft to spray
toxic herbicides over the right-of-way because liability for aerial spraying must
then be considered in conjunction with the property rights of the parties to the
easement agreement.
In Kell v. Appalachian Power Co.4 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals was confronted with this problem. Because the court was primarily
concerned with property rights, it considered the general rights of parties to
easement agreements, the general rules of construction applied to such inden-
tures, and the nature of the activity involved. The court ruled that the grantor-
owner of the land retains certain rights and interests in the land subject to the
easement and that the language in the indenture5 did not authorize the grantee
to apply toxic herbicides to the right-of-way by aerial broadcast spraying.
' Kennedy, Liability in the Aerial Application of Pesticides, 22 S.D.L. REv. 75 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Kennedy]. See also Comment, Agricultural Pesticides: The Urgent Need for Har-
monization of International Regulation, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111 (1979). Although aviation in
agriculture is not new, dusting and spraying did not assume great importance until after World
War II. This was brought about by a surplus of aircraft and trained pilots and the development of
the herbicide 2, 4-D. McBreen, Legal Implications of Agricultural Aviation, 18 J. AIR L. & CoM.
399, 399 (1951).
2 Drift is a phenomenon which occurs when air is the medium through which the pesticide is
applied to the target area; it causes the pesticide to come into contact with areas outside the
target. Drift is a function of various factors: the chemical nature of the pesticide, the physical state
in which it is applied, the method of application, the volatility of the substance, and atmospheric
conditions.
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 76.
Id. at 75.
289 S.E.2d 450 (W.Va. 1982).
The language in the indenture gave the power company the right to cut and remove trees,
overhanging branches or other obstructions that endangered the safety, or interfered with the use
of the right of way. The use of herbicides was not mentioned. Id. at 451.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kell was a suit brought by landowners seeking to permanently enjoin the
Appalachian Power Company from using any form of toxic herbicide to clear
trees, branches and other obstructions from the right-of-way granted to the
power company.' The power company, asserting its rights under the indenture
agreement, not only admitted using a helicopter to spray the easement on two
different occasions but also stated its intention to continue spraying the area.
The parties relied on their respective interpretations of the indenture and
cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.7 After hearing argument, the
circuit court granted the power company's motion and the Kells appealed.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals viewed the case as present-
ing a novel question, and the issue was framed by Justice McHugh as follows:
Is a power company authorized to spray toxic herbicides from an aircraft over
its right-of-way under language in an indenture which provides... [the power
company] with the right, privilege and authority ... to construct, erect, oper-
ate and maintain a line or lines for the purpose of transmitting electric or
other power ... together with the right ... to cut and at its option, remove
... any trees, overhanging branches or other obstructions which may endan-
ger the safety or interfere with the use of said poles and towers or fixtures or
wires .... 1
Applying a balancing test of the relative rights of parties to easements, the
court held that the power company was not so authorized. The order of the
circuit court was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant the
injunction prayed for by the appellants.9
III. PRIOR LAW
The issue in Kell, although simply stated, is nevertheless complex and re-
quires an examination of the law in several areas. The principle areas of con-
sideration are the general rights of parties to easement agreements, the general
rules of construction applied to such indentures, and the nature of the activity
involved.
Although an easement is an interest in land'0 it gives no title to the land.11
Case law dealing specifically with power company easements supports this no-
tion and indicates that a power company acquires neither a fee interest 2 nor
' Although the indenture was actually entered into in 1939 by the Kells' predecessors in inter-
est there was no question as to the validity of that agreement. Id. at 451.
7 All parties conceded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case. Id.
at 452.
8 Id. at 453.
9 Id. at 456-57.
,0 Paden City v. Felton, 136 W.Va. 127, 66 S.E.2d 280 (1951).
"i Korricks Dry Goods Co. v. Kendal, 33 Ariz. 325, 264 P. 692 (1928).
,2 See, e.g., De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948);
Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322 (1934); Patterson Orchard Co. v.
Southwest Ark. Util. Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 S.W.2d 1028 (1929); Dickel v. Bucks-Falls Elec. Co.,
306 Pa. 504, 160 A. 115 (1932). This authority was recognized by the court in Kel, 289 S.E.2d at
[Vol. 85
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/10
UTILITY RIGHT-OF-WAYS
the right to exclusive possession of the right-of-way."3 It follows that both par-
ties to an easement have certain rights and interests which must be considered.
The extent of permissible use by the owner of the dominant estate varies
with the degree of specificity of the indenture. An easement granted in general
terms without limitations may be used for any reasonable purpose, 4 but if the
terms are specific they define the limits.15 The general rule with regard to
power company easements is that the power company may enter the land to
maintain the right-of-way and effect necessary repairs."l There is also author-
ity that the dominant owner may vary his mode of enjoying the easement and
take advantage of modern inventions if by doing so he can more fully carry out
the purpose for which the easement was granted.17 These rights are tempered,
however, by a line of cases prohibiting the easement holder from increasing the
burden or imposing additional burdens on the servient estate.'"
The owner of the servient estate also has certain rights. An easement does
not extinguish the landowner's right to ordinary use of the property 9 and the
owner of the servient estate may use the land for any purpose which does not
unreasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of the dominant estate.
20
The owner of land subject to a right to construct and maintain electrical power
transmission lines has been held to have the right to use the land in any man-
ner which does not interfere with such lines." Specifically, the grantor may
cultivate the strip, pass along and across it, and use it in any way which does
not affect the rights of the grantee." Clearly, each party's rights under an ease-
ment are relative to the other's. Thus, in the absence of a grant of exclusive
use, the owners of the dominant and servient estates must use the land in such
a manner as not to interfere with one another.
2
"
453 n.8.
13 See, e.g., Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Ark. Util. Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 S.W.2d
1028 (1929); Draker v. Iowa Elec. Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 182 N.W. 896 (1921); Alabama Power Co. v.
Keystone Lime Co., 191 Ala. 58, 67 So. 833 (1914); Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Elk-
horn City Land Co., 212 Ky. 624, 279 S.W. 1082 (1926); Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Wethersfield,
165 Conn. 211, 332 A.2d 83 (1973). The court in Kell recognized this authority, 289 S.E.2d at 453
n.9.
" Cushman Virginia Corp. v. Barnes, 204 Va. 245, 129 S.E.2d 633 (1963); State Road Comm'n
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 115 W. Va. 647, 177 S.E. 530 (1934). See also Shingleton v. State, 260
N.C. 451, 133 S.E.2d 183 (1963); Cantrell v. Appalachian Power Co., 148 Va. 431, 139 S.E. 247
(1927).
25 City of Lynchburg v. Smith, 186 S.E. 51 (Va. 1936); Shock v. Holt Lumber Co., 107 W. Va.
259, 148 S.E. 73 (1929). See also Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power, 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661
(1956).
16 Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958); Moore v. Indiana & Mich. Elec.
Co., 229 Ind. 309, 95 N.E.2d 210 (1950).
" Diller v. St. Louis, S. & P. R.R., 304 Ill. 373, 136 N.E. 703 (1922); Davis v. Jefferson County
Tel. Co., 82 W. Va. 357, 95 S.E. 1042 (1918).
,8 E.g., Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1980); McBrayer v. Davis, 307
S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1957).
" Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Wethersfield, 165 Conn. 211, 332 A.2d 83 (1973).
20 Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926).
2' Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E.2d 191 (1949).
22 Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926).
21 Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1981); Miller v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 48 Or. App. 1007,
1983]
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In construction of easement agreements, it is generally held that the ordi-
nary rules of contract construction and interpretation apply.24 As with any
written agreement, the intention of the parties is controlling.2 5 Although a
grant in general terms is construed to imply a right of all reasonable uses, 26 the
right-of-way cannot be used to burden the servient estate to a greater extent
than was contemplated or intended at the time of the grant.2 7 Furthermore,
when the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need to consider ex-
trinsic events to show the extent of the right granted.2 8
Finally, it is necessary to consider the nature of the activity involved. The
primary features which make aerial spraying dangerous are the toxicity of the
chemicals used and drift.29 Until recently, the problem of drift was the main
focus of case law in this area, and most cases dealing with toxic herbicides and
pesticides have been grounded in the various theories of tort liability.3° Recov-
ery has been allowed on numerous theories ranging from negligence and the
requirement of due care under the circumstances 1 to strict liability32 on the
ground that aerial spraying is, per se, inherently dangerous. It is often difficult
to detect exactly what theory the courts are following,3 but most are willing to
accept theories of action which do not require proof of negligent conduct. '
The present and potential problems associated with drift are obvious, but the
full ramifications of the chemical hazard are only now coming to light. 5 In-
creased concern over the effects of chemical agents on man and the environ-
ment has generated a myriad of laws and regulations,38 and in recognition of
the dangers involved and as a matter of public policy, pesticides and herbicides
are regulated at both federal17 and state8 levels.
Thus, although various authority exists specifically regarding aerial appli-
cation of toxic herbicides, a review of the cases brings to light the unique as-
pect of Kell. Prior law in this area has been grounded in tort, whereas the
618 P.2d 992 (1980); Lindsey v. Shaw, 210 Miss. 333, 49 So. 2d 580 (1950).
24 See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Center, Inc v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir.
1949); Hennen v. Deveney, 71 W. Va. 629, 77 S.E. 142 (1913).
28 See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga. 608, 1 S.E.2d 579 (1939).
28 Davis v. Jefferson County Tel. Co., 82 W. Va. 357, 95 S.E. 1042 (1918).
27 E.g., Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1980); Doody v. Spurr, 315
Mass. 129, 51 N.E.2d 981 (1943).
28 Hennen v. Deveney, 71 W. Va. 629, 77 S.E. 142 (1913).
29 Comment, Crop Dusting: Two Theories of Liability?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 476 (1968). See also
Kennedy, supra note 1.
30 Kennedy, supra note 1.
31 E.g., Wieting v. Ball Air Spray, Inc., 84 S.D. 493, 173 N.W.2d 272 (1969).
2 E.g., Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
32 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 88.
3, Id. at 96.
32 Comment, Agricultural Pesticides: The Urgent Need for Harmonization of International
Regulation, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 113-15 (1979); Note, Environmental Law: Agricultural Pesti-
cides, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 53 (1974).
38 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 90-92. See also supra note 35.
37 E.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-49 (1976).
38 West Virginia Pesticide Use and Application Act of 1975, W. VA. CODE §§ 19-16B-1 to 26
(1977 & Supp. 1982).
[Vol. 85
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problem here involves contract construction and a balancing of property inter-
ests. While this case law is clearly not on point, it is nevertheless useful in
understanding how courts have approached the problem and in making an
analogy with the situation in Kell.
IV. ANALYSIs OF THE CASE
Although Kell presented the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
with a novel issue, the court approached the problem in a very traditional
manner. The primary issue, whether the power company could spray its right-
of-way with toxic herbicides, was subdivided and the areas of concern sepa-
rately considered. In reaching its decision the court affirmed existing law in
some areas and extended it in others.
Construing the indenture, Justice McHugh noted that the intent of the
parties is controlling and then proceeded to explain that since aerial spraying
to control vegetation was unknown in 1939 it could not have been within the
contemplation of the parties.39 Although correct, the treatment of this impor-
tant area is unnecessarily brief and not as convincing as it might have been.
Perhaps a better approach would have been to spend more time dealing with
the specific language of the agreement. For example, the indenture says "to cut
and at its option, remove." This certainly seems clear and unambiguous, and
the law in this regard is that if there be no ambiguity, one must arrive at the
intention of the parties from the language used.40 If, however, the indenture
was construed to be ambiguous then prior law dictates that we resort to the
circumstances surrounding the transaction, the situation of the parties, the
subject matter, and the subsequent acts of the parties.41 This line of cases sup-
ports and would have added credibility to the court's conclusion.
The most confusing aspect of the opinion is that dealing with the general
rights of parties to easement agreements. Prior law in this area provides that
the easement owner can make the right-of-way as usable as possible for the
intended purpose so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the rights
of the servient estate owner.42 Specifically, case decisions have indicated that
an electric utility can do whatever is reasonably necessary to effect enjoyment
of its easement for purposes of construction, operation and maintenance of
high voltage transmission lines. 43 The phrases "reasonably necessary" and "un-
reasonably interfere" are characteristic of the prior decisions and have set the
standard for determining the rights of the easement holder.
While the court unmistakably accepts the common law notion that the
rights of the easement holder must be weighed against the rights of the gran-
tor-owner, it appears to have tipped the scale in favor of the landowner. For
example, in reference to aerial spraying, the court notes that "[it] inflicts un-
39 289 S.E.2d at 456.
4o See Flaherty v. Fleming, 58 W. Va. 669, 671, 52 S.E. 857, 858 (1906).
41 See Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W. Va. 212, 23 S.E. 692 (1895).
42 See, e.g., Moore v. White, 159 Mich. 460, 124 N.W. 62 (1909).
43 Holding v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 400 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 1980).
1983]
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necessary damage. . . is not necessary to the maintenance or protection of the
power company's equipment" and "impermissibly interferes with the grantor-
owner's rights and interest.""' From this language it is unclear whether the
court is following the common law "reasonable" standard of adopting a more
stringent "necessary" standard. To be sure, in the absence of a specific inden-
ture provision to the contrary, the aerial application of toxic herbicides will not
pass either standard. What is not certain, however, is whether the grantee can
do what is "reasonably necessary" under the circumstances or will be limited
solely to those acts which are "necessary." Kell does not specify which stan-
dard lower courts should apply.
The recognized right of an easement holder to take advantage of techno-
logical improvements presents another problem for the court. Kell initially
appears to limit the right. Upon further consideration, however, it is apparent
that the court has simply qualified this right, included it in the rights of the
easement holder generally, and balanced it against the interests of the grantor-
owner.45 Although it would be easy to criticize the court for offering no clear
guidelines on when technological advances may be used, this is an area where
the facts of each case are determinative and ad hoc decisions may be
unavoidable.
The basic reasoning in the opinion is sound and it is evident that the court
could have ended its discussion and held for the Kells at this point. Instead,
Justice McHugh added a lengthy discussion of the hazards of herbicides in
general and aerial spraying in particular."6 In doing so, the court cited with
approval the language of selected jurisdictions which characterized aerial
spraying of toxic herbicides as "hazardous activity. '47 Although this dicta may
support the court's holding and be useful in distinguishing between "reasona-
ble" and "necessary" acts, it might have been omitted without affecting the
decision. Perhaps the court felt compelled to address the problem and recog-
nize the hazards involved as a matter of public policy. Whatever the reason,
this discussion does show that the court is responsive to public concern over
the perplexing aspects of pollution caused by agricultural chemicals. Specifi-
cally, the court was quick to point out that one of the herbicides used on the
Kell property contained the same two ingredients as "Agent Orange. '4 In any
event, whether significant in this case or not, these comments may have an
eventual impact in the area of tort law. At the very least, it is an indication of
how the court will rule when called upon to define the degree of care required
to avoid tort liability for aerial spraying.
4 289 S.E.2d at 456.
45 Id.
41 Id. at 454-56.
47 Id. at 456.
11 Id. at 452 n.2. "Agent Orange and its associated military and civilian herbicides containing
2, 4, 5-T with the contaminant dioxin have had far-reaching impacts. These herbicides were obvi-
ously utilized before the full ramifications of their use and effects were sufficiently known." Mey-
ers, Soldier of Orange: The Administrative, Diplomatic, Legislative and Litigatory Impact of
Herbicide Agent Orange in South Vietnam, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 197 (1979).
[Vol. 851000
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Finally, the court cited and heavily relied upon Stirling v. Dixie Electric49
in support of its conclusion in favor of the Kells' position. In Stirling, a land-
owner sought compensation for damages to trees, plants and shrubs occasioned
when the power company used a helicopter to spray toxic herbicides over its
right-of-way. 50 In holding for the landowner, the Louisiana court noted that
"the extent to which the chemical was used was excessive" and "not permissi-
ble under the circumstances."'" The court added that if the removal of trees
and shrubs becomes "necessary ... it must be in a reasonable manner, with
due regard to the rights of all parties."'
2
Stirling is basically an extension of the common law principle that both
parties to an easement have certain rights and interests and each must, as far
as possible, respect the other's use.5 3 Although the Stirling opinion is well rea-
soned, it is important to note that the court made no reference to authority on
this particular point. Furthermore, the court did not specifically rule out the
use of herbicides when it stated that "perhaps the application of the chemical
could have served the desired purpose had it been applied by means other than
a helicopter and on a more selective basis." '54 Although the facts appear identi-
cal, the cases are distinguishable on the approaches taken by the courts. In
Kell the primary concern was the relative property rights of parties to ease-
ment agreements. Actual damages were not discussed and the opinion implies
that even potential interference constitutes grounds for an injunction. Stirling,
on the other hand, was an action seeking compensation for damages along and
outside the servitude. Actual damages were shown and experts testified on that
point. Thus, although Stirling does somewhat support the Kell reasoning, it is
clearly not directly on point.
V. CONCLUSION
Kell leaves little doubt that, in the absence of a specific indenture provi-
sion to the contrary, the aerial application of toxic herbicides will not be per-
mitted over easement right-of-ways. Unfortunately, it is not clear what other
rights of the easement holder may have been affected by the decision, and the
question of whether the easement owner may continue doing what is "reasona-
bly necessary" or will be limited solely to "necessary" acts remains
unanswered.
The decision clearly favors the individual landowner at the expense of the
easement holder, but it is the consumer who will feel the most immediate im-
pact. Aerial spraying is the most cost-efficient method of controlling unwanted
49 334 So. 2d 427 (La. 1977).
:0 The pertinent part of the servitude agreement gave the grantee the right "to cut and trim
trees and shrubbery to the extent necessary to keep them clear of said electric line. . . and to cut
down from time to time all dead, weak, leaning or dangerous trees that are tall enough to strike
the wires in falling. " Id. at 428.
:1 Id. at 429.
52 Id.
:3 See Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1981).
1 344 So. 2d at 429.
19831 1001
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vegetation and any restriction on its use will naturally result in higher right-of-
way maintenance costs to the utility and ultimately higher rates to the con-
sumer. On the other hand, the beneficial effects of less exposure to chemical
hazards must not be overlooked. When viewed in this light the decision is
clearly public interest oriented.
Although the primary concern in Kell dealt with property rights, the deci-
sion may also have an impact in the area of tort law. By recognizing aerial
spraying of herbicides as "hazardous activity" West Virginia has impliedly
adopted a higher standard of care for those involved in this activity.
Thad S. Huffman
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